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but from man's conviction that he is in touch and connection with ultimate spiritual reality. It is from such an experience that religion takes its rise and religious ideals are created. In the drama of the spiritual life the Divine Reality plays the leading rôle.

To careless reading or transcription such errors as these are due: the quotation from St. Paul on page 19, where "spirit of God," should be "spirit of Christ"; the verse, "If ye love not your brethren," etc., is quoted on page 347 as if it were spoken by Jesus. *Ereigniss* is misspelled on page 222. In the quotation from Shelly, "*pane*" takes place of "*dome*"; Professor Starbuck's book on "*The Psychology of Religion*" is twice given a wrong title; the Hindu prayer is not found on page 261, as stated on page 298, nor Augustine's prayer, as stated on page 318; there are also several sentences where the meaning is not in accord with the context, and the word "æsthetic" is sometimes used in the ordinary sense and at other times as meaning mystical.

DANIEL EVANS.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE FREUDIAN WISH, AND ITS PLACE IN ETHICS. EDWIN B. HOLT.  
Henry Holt & Co. 1915. Pp. 208. \$1.25.

The author of this interesting volume is well known as an able advocate of the empirical, "realistic," objective method of studying the world and life, and as a consistent opponent of the subjective, introspective, *a priori* method; which he thinks open to the serious criticism of encouraging vague and misleading speculation and to have contributed little of real value for ethics or for human conduct. There will be many persons who, like the reviewer, will fail to recognize the stamp of permanence and all-sufficiency, of freedom from bias or from "wish," in the mode of looking at the truth advocated by Dr. Holt, any more than in that which he repudiates, and yet will find in this stimulating book, as in *The Concept of Consciousness* by the same author, a number of theses that should command admiration and attention. That the author's attitude is frankly materialistic will be accepted as an asset of value by some readers, and must be forgotten for the moment by the rest, if they would learn the lessons that the essay has to teach.

As in his former book Dr. Holt set himself the task of describing the emergence of consciousness among the progressive integrations of the unfolding series of "natural" phenomena, and of emphasizing, let us say, the more obviously objective aspect of the man—nature

(not man + nature) situation, so here he studies, in analogous fashion, the problem of "behavior," in its relation to morals, ethics, and religion on the one hand, and to the motor reflex on the other. Throughout the argument the string that ties the body and the acts of man to the body and the acts of "nature" is kept ever taut, so that the reader's thought shall never be allowed to wander very far away from the physical mechanisms that are taken as the earliest prototype of those organic processes which eventually figure as mental in the highest sense. As in all such demonstrations, a somewhat painful jolt is felt as one passes from nature (as here conceived) to even the simpler living organisms with their relatively complex processes of reaction and of choice. But this gap is bridgeable perhaps by the life of the organisms known as "tropisms," and its existence affords in any event no stronger case against the materialistic argument than is furnished by the difficulty of conceiving of a universe built on the plan of strict relativity, which natural science finds amply sufficient for its special needs and would gladly regard as sufficient for all purposes.

One is then led rapidly through the ascending series of organic reactions, in such a skilful fashion as to be almost persuaded that the principle of "integration," growing ever more elaborate though still mechanistic in its nature, is really able to account for all that man most prizes in the form of love, intelligence, imagination, and will. Indeed, no one can doubt that the transition from man to nature is of such a sort as to show the essential identity of the two; the only question is, Of what nature is the motive influence of both? Is it non-creative and one of a series of mutually convertible forces? Or is it — although so slender, shadowy, and invisible — an indispensable, irresistible, all-pervading, and really creative energy, of which the mind is the best example?

It is easy for any one who knows the sincere objectivity of Freud's work and is familiar with its keenness, honesty, and fearlessness, to see why the evidence he adduces appeals so strongly to the author of this volume; and those who, like the reviewer, are in warm sympathy with the psychoanalytic movement, have good reason to be grateful for the brilliant exposition here given of the "wish" and wish-conflicts, as constituting the essential element in human life. It is, on the other hand, a matter of doubtful justification to identify wishing with striving; that is, to interpret the wish only in terms of its outcome in accomplishment or as an attitude looking toward accomplishment. In doing this Dr. Holt seems to deprive life's conflicts of a great portion of their warmth and richness, and throws

aside the Freudian conception of the wish, in the interest of a scheme that seems to the reviewer needlessly narrow and artificial.

"Matter" subject to "law" can only "do"; it cannot "feel." And so, as the universe must be monistic, and as the most obvious features of it — so the author thinks — are "law" and "matter," therefore all feelings and emotions, and preëminently all wishes, must, in the last analysis, be classified as "motor attitudes," an assignment which to the ardent wisher seems anything but natural. But if the wish is thus limited in scope on the one side, it is accorded the widest possible scope upon the other. Construe its nature as one may, Dr. Holt is doubtless right in asserting that the wish, as described by Freud, is the proper unit of psychology, and that "the problem of good conduct . . . ought to receive some clarification . . . from a science that studies the mind and the will in their actual operation." He is certainly right also in asserting that the "wish," whatever else it may be, is closely related to the will. "Wishes conflict when they would lead the body into opposed lines of conduct. . . . And of two opposed attitudes only one can be carried into effect; the other is suppressed."

It would be difficult to make more clear than Dr. Holt has done the relation of these two sorts of wishes and the significance for education, and eventually for ethics, of learning how to come to terms with one's repressed motives. The literature of psychoanalysis has grown to be a large one, but the outline which is given in this book, while not in all respects such as Freud would probably endorse as adequate, is eminently illuminating and instructive. It is true also that to gain a dynamic conception of the wish, rather than to leave it as simply identical with sensation, is a real advantage.

Under the heading of "The Wish in Ethics," reasons are brought forward for preferring an ethics based on experience and having roots that extend back as far as one cares to go into biologic life, to systems of ethics "which posit an *abstract* sanction for right conduct" but "never discover *what* 'right' is." The ethics of this latter sort Dr. Holt refers to, somewhat sardonically, as ethics "*von oben herab*"; whereas the kind that he prefers, and considers to be the only system which stands in real touch with experience, and so the only one which is genuine and trustworthy, is that "*von unten hinauf*." But this judgment, although it has a real meaning, can claim no more solid basis of comprehensiveness than can the philosophic argument of the book itself.

It would be easy to write a volume in discussing, both adversely

and in praise, the many points, a few of which have been here alluded to, that are brought forward in this brilliant essay. But it must suffice to say that every student of human nature should read it for himself. The writers who have endeavored to construct a systematic theory of life and conduct based on the introspective method have often laid themselves open to very stringent criticism; and the world owes a great deal to the empiricists and the "behaviorists" for contributions of a lasting value. The representatives of both parties have still, however, much to learn, each from the other.

JAMES J. PUTNAM.

BOSTON.

THEISM AND HUMANISM. THE GIFFORD LECTURES for 1914. A. J. BALFOUR. Hodder & Stoughton. 1915. Pp. 274. \$1.75.

Mr. Balfour's purpose and method are well stated in two sentences of the concluding chapter: "My desire has been to show that all we think best in human culture, whether associated with beauty, goodness, or knowledge, requires God for its support, that Humanism without Theism loses more than half its value" (p. 248): "The root principle which, by its constant recurrence in slightly different forms, binds together like an operative *leit-motif* the most diverse material, is that if we would maintain the value of our highest beliefs and emotions, we must find for them a congruous origin. Beauty must be more than an accident. The source of morality must be moral. The source of knowledge must be rational" (pp. 249-50).

Fundamental to the whole discussion is the distinction drawn between the causal and the cognitive series of beliefs, that is, between beliefs which are more or less deeply rooted in the very being of man as part of the nature of things, and hence have intuitive probability rising towards inevitableness, and others which are the outcome of an intellectual process and have only logical validity. It is not to be deemed the mere cynicism of a man versed in public affairs to hold that in the last analysis all our beliefs are reducible to the causal series — "Scratch an argument, and you find a cause" (p. 61) — for science itself inclines to a similar deterministic declaration and thus gives rise to the central question of the book: If our beliefs are grounded in the nature of things and are therefore presumably coherent with it, how must that nature be conceived — in terms of Theism or Naturalism?

This radical inquiry, however, is not at the front in the earlier chapters which deal with ethics and æsthetics, and becomes insistent only in the discussion of knowledge. It is shown that the sense